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ABSTRACT 
This paper reinterprets core issues in economic anthropology by exploring what would 
happen if transfers became one of its key theoretical resources. After briefly describing 
examples of use of the term “transfer” in anthropology and economics, where it is both 
pervasive and somewhat nebulous, transfers are defined as movements of economic matter 
while transactions are the forms that arise through the configuration of transfers. 
Transactional sub-categories such as Maussian gift exchange or market exchange are then 
taken as socio-cultural and/or theoretical reifications, thereby becoming the goal of 
anthropological description.  Examining the politics of creating and sustaining transactional 
sub-categories by first looking at the elementary transfers out of which they are constructed 
places ‘one-way transfers’ such as slavery and theft on the same conceptual plane as 
reciprocal and market transactions, rather than as a derivative or a remainder of either/both.  
Gifts and gambling are considered in greater detail. Gambling and ‘pure gifts’ become types 
of ‘one-way transfers,’ engineered to possess only one component transfer, and Maussian 
gifts explicitly connect transfers together in a particular politics. The paper then picks out 
effective examples from the existing anthropological literature that employ an incipient 
version of the transfer strategy and in-so-doing demonstrate its nascent explanatory promise.  
 
PAPER 
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I here recommend a terminology based upon the notion of transfers for use when dealing 
with economic transactions. In this terminology transactions are built out of the movements 
of economic matter within them, each movement with a single directionality being a 
transfer.1 Transfers work as an ideological leveller when juxtaposing transactive forms that 
are privileged by anthropology, such as pure gifts, bride wealth payments, Maussian gifts and 
commodity exchanges, with those that are largely peripheral to anthropology (but not so to 
other disciplines), such as gambling, social security schemes, and barter. Instead of defining 
each of these forms of transaction before proceeding to contrast them, I start with 
transactions’ constituent transfers. For that reason, and to lean on a wan metaphor, this essay 
provides a description of the ecosystem of transactions that envelope us all, together with the 
mitochondrial energy transfers that sustain the ecosystem as a whole. As suggested by my 
metaphor, “transactions” here mean each and every imaginable instance during which 
congealed human activity is considered to move.2 Subsumed within the meta-category 
“transaction” and dissected by the micro-category transfer, the ideological opposition 
between such categories as gifts and commodities are shuffled over from their usual place as 
starting points of analysis, becoming instead ethnographic particulars belonging to given 
contexts that result from the political work of defining the nature of transfers. Only later do I 
turn to Maussian gifts, pure gifts, gambling etc., the megafauna populating our transactional 
Anthropocene, seeing each as sustained by materiality, politics, power and enumerative 
processes all bundled together through iteration and precedent. The framework intentionally 
places the specificity, temporality, inventiveness, and disputed nature of dealing in 
transactional categories centre stage from the outset. 
A shift of emphasis toward transfers is not intended as a dismissal of the existing 
anthropological categories of circulation, but a lateral move. The initial choice of unit should 
likewise do nothing to invalidate or denude the power of such forces as obligation, 
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reciprocity or alienation, only expand the domain of study while simplifying the terms of 
analysis in what has become a bewildering set of debates. The questions posed by economic 
activity and the literature surrounding it are then ever so slightly restructured, creating an 
opportunity to turn over old stones.  
The novelty of transfers is that of a tool to analyse the problematics of transactional 
sub-categories such as gifts from the start of the description, rather than reaching 
problematization as a conclusion, which is where existing literature usually ends. With 
transfers one starts from ambiguity and then reaches axioms of exchange by describing how 
ambiguities come to appear resolved (or fail to do so), rather than the other way round. Not 
without irony, this theoretical article therefore aims to facilitate more ethnographically led 
and reflective analyses that highlight 1) the specificity of situations that evoke thought and 
action, with their own temporalities, which may be invented in the moment, and 2) the terms 
under which the participants define what they are doing and thinking. I will also infer how 
systemic interpretation might apply to transfers, as it does to gifts and markets. When I zero 
in on Maussian gifts and gambling, the former is imagined as an expression of struggles to 
anchor economic transfers to reciprocal obligation, the latter cast as a manifestation of efforts 
to decouple economic transfers from reciprocal obligation.  
 
One-way transfers 
Given the expansive scope, it is appropriate to begin with James Carrier’s (2005) edited 
volume A Handbook of Economic Anthropology, Part III of which contains five chapters 
under the heading “CIRCULATION.” These are “Ceremonial exchange,” “The gift and gift 
economy,” “Barter,” “The anthropology of markets,” and “One-way economic transfers.” In 
his short introduction Carrier appropriately points out that circulation has been the most 
fruitful and impactful area of economic anthropological investigation, but also notes that this 
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attention has fallen unevenly, particularly with respect to the last subfield, “One-way 
economic transfers.” This has received scant attention despite the fact that it “quietly” raises 
important questions about the assumption that “circulation requires the exchange of value” 
(Carrier 2005:229). I hope to raise the volume here, suggesting that the one-way-ness of one-
way transfers are already an important part of our analysis of multi-directional transactions, 
and that by recognising as much, and by embracing the implications, anthropologists might 
generate a productive dialogue about transactions at the broadest level. Indeed the problem of 
whether circulation requires the exchange of value should lose its relevance if, as I suggest, 
transfers are equally operative in both exchanges of value and one-way transfers.  
In 1977, in a largely forgotten book called The Origins of the Economy, Frederic 
Pryor turned to the term “one-way transfer” as a means of categorising his data on economic 
activity. Pryor needed to distinguish between transmissions of wealth that were balanced by a 
material counterpart, which he called “exchange” (and which included market or commodity 
transactions), and ones which were not, called “one-way transfers.” Pryor’s larger aim was to 
use statistical regressions to establish correlations between various aspects of diverse 
economies. His categorisation (probably taken from economics) cut through a proliferation of 
anthropological jargon obscuring the cross-cultural hard data he had collated on the 
transmission of valuables.  
One-way transfer Rationale 
Household pooling Parents transfer to all their children, but care for ageing 
parents is generally restricted to a subset of a parent’s 
children. 
Forager food-sharing Allocation is not commensurate with status or 
participation in acquisitive activity. 
Inheritance The inheritance is generally not on the basis of prior 
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economic interaction. 
Endowments Donors are not supposed to retain any control over the 
assets.  
Theft Thieves take from victims for their gain. 
Hospitality The host cares for the guest whether or not they will 
meet again. 
Gambling The winner takes wealth from a loser without binding 
obligation. 
Table 1: A list of Pryor’s exemplars of one-way transfers, together with the rationale given. 
 
Robert Hunt (2000, 2002, 2005) took up Pryor's exchanges/one-way transfers 
distinction and championed adding the term transfer to the economic anthropological lexicon. 
The two dominant conceptual frameworks for circulation, Hunt argues, are gift and market, 
both of which are kinds of exchange within which one party and another compare the things 
they exchange. Market exchange is of the greatest interest to economists, while gift exchange 
has been most central to anthropology. Hunt provides a handy definition of a third mode of 
circulation, transfers. A transfer is “the shift of a valued (X) from one social unit (A) to 
another social unit (B). The valued can be tangible, a service, or knowledge. The shift can 
refer to changes in possession, as well as to shifts in ownership. ... The X being transferred 
has economic content. It contains the efforts of production (work, skill, and experience)” 
(Hunt 2002:108). 
Hunt’s definition implies that transfers are the basic unit of which all transactions are 
made, and exchange is a kind of elaboration (where another transfer replaces the original) 
(see also Hunt 2000). Pryor (1977:30) had likewise concluded that generalised exchange (i.e. 
intercommunity sharing, demand sharing)3 is actually a series of transfers because these 
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transactions never reach a formal balance.  But Hunt’s observation passes by almost 
unexplored and instead those transfers that have no counterpart are juxtaposed to exchanges 
as categories of transaction belonging on the same scale: gift, market, and transfer (Hunt 
2002). I surmise that for Hunt transactional types are essentially ethnographic empirical units, 
and therefore transfers cease to be transfers once they are recognised empirically as 
exchanges (e.g. Hunt 2000:19-21). It is only by operating at the scale of empirical 
phenomena that one-way transfers could be said to pose questions about the exchange of 
value found in other, equally empirically observable kinds of transaction because the 
problems depend on the reification of these subcategories. Only as a reified transaction-type 
can transfers be said to have no return counterpart, and thus no clear basis for an exchange of 
value.  
By the time the Handbook of Economic Anthropology comes out, Hunt (2005) seems to 
have retreated from the implication that the transfer is of a different order to exchange and is 
content to represent what he calls “one-way transfers” as simply an underexplored subfield 
(which it undoubtedly is). But faced with an already creaking transaction vocabulary, I want 
to use Hunt’s original insight to instead clear some brush.  
In fact it is the retreat that presents the bigger problems, because a subcategory of 
“one-way transfers” looks positively dysmorphic, lumping together what would otherwise be 
considered radically different transactions. In the Handbook these include household pooling, 
forager food-sharing, inheritance, endowments, theft, charity, pensions, slavery, and 
gambling. Not that we should expect any formal elegance in human activities, but the 
situation is clearly obstructive when theft and charity are in one subcategory that is then 
opposed as a whole to gift exchange. It seems that in the literature of economic anthropology, 
one-way transfers are largely residual, a collection of bones found in the same cave. 
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Nevertheless it is evident that one-way transfers, such as they exist empirically, 
together represent both a vast amount of value and a huge proportion of wealth movements. 
In 2014 the market value of the endowment funds of colleges and universities in the United 
States was US$535 billion (NCES 2016:744). The total value of stolen goods in the UK was 
£1.8 billion in 2013-2014, down from £6.9 billion in 1995 (Home Office 2015). These are 
large absolute numbers, but they are small potatoes compared to the slavery upon which the 
United States’ economic development was built (Fogel and Engerman 1974). Inheritance 
currently stands at 11% of French national income (Piketty 2014:380). Welfare provision in 
the UK accounted for 10% of UK Government spending in 2016 (HM Treasury 2016).  
The above one-way transfers are undeniably significant, but consider the proportion 
of all transactions in immediate-return hunter-gatherer societies that are one-way transfers 
(Hunt 2000; Woodburn 1998). Consider also aggregating all the household pooling that 
occurs in single-income households in (post)industrialised economies. Pryor (1977) was able 
to estimate that in 1970 intra-family transfers accounted for a startling 39 per cent of national 
income in the United States. While these one-way transfers may look deviant or at least 
unusual in either anthropological or indeed economic theories that highlight bi- or multi-
lateral exchanges, they clearly are not empirically uncommon or tricky for the lay person to 
grasp. In fact, boiled down to its bare bones the physical law of entropy makes a system of 
one-way transfers the essential condition for all reproductive life since it must replace itself. 
One-way transfers are simply theoretically undervalued (but see Schokkaert 2006; Ythier 
2006).  
While these activities have very different effects and politics, they are united 
theoretically because there is no apparent counter to the transfer of wealth from one entity to 
another. Specifically it is both that nothing moves in the other direction and that there is no 
definitive obligation to make a return. Reasons for lack of obligation to return range broadly, 
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from the death of the donor, the recipient’s impending demise, that the wealth was won, 
stolen, or, as in slavery, the recipient took ownership of the donor and all that they produce. It 
is in terms of lack that these transactions are thought through by scholars. In anthropology 
typical responses to one-way transfers such as charity take the theoretical vantage of 
exchange as their starting point, discussing charitable situations as attempts to systematically 
discount the ever-present tendency to feel obliged to reciprocate. Thus in the language of 
exchange charity is a chastened gift or a commodity denied a market (Laidlaw 2000; M. 
Strathern 2012). In this way an exchange-centred anthropology has somehow managed to 
render one-way transfers simultaneously parochial to the everyday practice of anthropology 
and to turn them into curious puzzles to be elaborately deciphered from within the exchange 
paradigm.  
 
Transfers in Economics 
Economists meanwhile have been using transfers as a concept for decades (if not developing 
it theoretically), most textbooks tracing transfers back at least as far as a debate between John 
Maynard Keynes and Bertil Ohlin in 1929. Brakman and van Marrewijk (1998) inform us 
that all economic exchanges involve transfers, most of which are purchases and therefore 
“bilateral transfers,” but they go on to focus, as all economic research on transfers seems to 
do, on “unilateral” transfers, what Robert Hunt called “one-way transfers,” i.e. a movement 
of wealth not matched by a return. It must be noted first that economists need not and often 
have not applied the same rules as anthropologists have in determining whether a transfer is 
“unilateral,” for economists it can be enough that an exchange of transfers is uneven, it need 
not be entirely unidirectional—a tendency probably related to their primary interest in market 
transactions.4 It would be fair to say that economists have built considerable knowledge of 
the metrics of transfers, particularly their relationships to other transactions, but the nature of 
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those transfers has been neglected. For economists transfers are simply found imbalances in 
the flow of value. In international trade and relations aid, debt forgiveness, investment grants, 
damages payments and remittances are characterised as “international transfers.” Within 
states the term “transfer payments” is applied most often to welfare programs, which transfer 
wealth or wealth-in-kind from those able to pay for it to those in need (called “public 
transfers”), and by extension to movements of wealth that occur within families (“private 
transfers”).  
Economists also use “transfer pricing” to denote the price strategies that firms use 
when they sell valuables between operations in one jurisdiction and operations in another. 
Companies manipulate these transfer prices, selling their own wares to another subsidiary 
based in a higher tax regime at high prices, thereby moving their profits to the lower tax 
jurisdiction. The deliberate result is an imbalanced flow of wealth from one jurisdiction to 
another. There are papers confirming that transfer pricing responds to tax rates (Clausing 
2003), determining which jurisdictions transfer pricing operates across (Bartelsman and 
Beetsma 2003), and discussing the technical problem of independent company “profit 
centres” in different jurisdictions each aiming to increase its own profit, potentially at the 
expense of the company as a whole (Hirshleifer 1956).  
As one would expect, an economic analysis of intra-familial “private transfers” 
centres on the measurability of non-market movements of wealth, with a focus upon the 
effectiveness of these activities in fostering generalised financial wellbeing. Papers 
investigate the relationship between “public-transfer” programs (welfare programs) and intra-
family level “private-transfers” (Cox and Jakubson 1995; Jensen 2003), others the 
relationship between “private-transfers” and income (Cox et al. 2004), yet others compare 
intra-family transfers from parents to children during life with bequests upon parents’ deaths 
(McGarry 1999). Although they do not express themselves in these terms, the papers explore 
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quantitatively the complicated and often conflicting human experiences of determining the 
one-way-ness or not of these transfers, potentially complimenting qualitative anthropological 
accounts of welfare (e.g. Edgar and Russell 1998; Gudeman and Rivera 1990; Morgen and 
Maskovsky 2003). 
“Conditional cash transfers” meanwhile link state interests in ‘good citizenship’ to 
economic transfers. These are welfare programmes requiring a recipient to make prespecified 
investments (usually in their children). As policy tools these have mushroomed in importance 
since the mid-1990s (World Bank 2009:4). Two of the earliest iterations of conditional cash 
transfers, Brazil’s Bolsa Família and Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly PROGRESA), are 
now the largest social assistance programs in their respective countries, covering millions of 
households and families (Eger and Damo 2014). Anthropologically, conditional cash 
transfers can be seen as governmental attempts to exert control over the effects of, among 
other things, intra-family transfers that thwart government’s stated aims.  
Economists have encountered definitional issues around such matters as whether 
pensions are transfers, which depends on whether they are linked conceptually to the 
payments one makes before retirement or to the income the fund generates and pays out after 
retirement (Moon 1984). Anthropology is critically equipped to address such questions, but to 
do so, I would argue, requires a re-evaluation of the bi-/multi-lateral exchange-based 
paradigm we share with economics. What both disciplines have right now are categories 
derived from ideal types that leave “one-way” or “unilateral” transfers as the residue of other 
forms of exchange, and which are therefore characterised in terms of what they ‘lack.’  
I now propose upending this situation: release the idea of a transfer from the inductive 
“one-way transfer” group of empirical phenomena and apply the transfer deductively as a 
micro-concept to all transactions as a kind of toolkit for theoretical bricolage. Instead of 
being an empirical outlier to more normal multilateral exchanges, the transfer then becomes a 
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theoretical motive (in the sense of movement) force that scaffolds all the world’s emergent 
transactions.  
 
Transfers 
To state things precisely, I use “transaction” as the collective term for the totality of 
overlapping ways that “valuables” are circulated within an economy, including both tangibles 
and intangibles such as knowledge. Instead of creating subcategories based on ideal-typical 
modes of circulation,5 I envisage skipping down to transfers, which are modelled as 
operating at an infra-transactional level.  
In discussion of concrete transactions I propose using the analytical term transfer to 
denote one isolated unidirectional component within that transaction, i.e. something passing 
from me to you or you to me;7 the component may or may not be reciprocated in the future, 
and may or may not be linked to a past transaction. The movement of a valuable from one 
entity to another is a “transfer,” it may be balanced with a return, in which case it becomes an 
“exchange” of two (or more) transfers (e.g. barter, purchase, or like for like exchange). If the 
return happens later, this would be a “delayed exchange” of two transfers (i.e. tit for tat). A 
“transfer” that is not accompanied by a return and has no prospect of generating one in the 
future is a “one-way transfer.” Such a “one-way transfer” is of course no less and no more a 
cultural artefact than an “exchange of transfers,” but a “one-way transfer” and an “exchange 
of transfers” can be analytically distinguished because the former contains only one 
component “transfer,” while the latter has two or more. The valuables in motion during a 
“one-way transfer” do not have a counter-valuable against which their value can be directly 
compared, whereas an “exchange of transfers” offers an opportunity for direct comparison.8 
There is therefore a qualitative difference between one-way transfers and two-way transfers, 
or exchanges, even if that difference can be crosscut by the parties’ intentions. A delayed 
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exchange conceptually bridges the two until it is completed, or the return is no longer 
possible. To mark the difference I use italics when I refer to the analytical category transfer. 
Ethnographically-reified transactions such as the “one-way transfer” appear in roman.    
The transfer is emphatically not claimed as a universally held principle in the same 
way as has been argued for terms like exchange, reciprocity, or the gift. However, as an 
analytical category the transfer can be used to delimit components within all the transactions 
that might be employed to propagate and enact what one takes to be either universal or 
localised principles. Transfers are not a reality to be found, they are a concept to be used, 
even if in some cases they are also a concept used by one’s subjects.  
The form of transfers that are included within each “transaction” will often be murky, 
for three reasons elaborated below: 1) the transfer may not be deemed delineable or 
enumerable (e.g. suckling an infant). 2) Linking one transfer to another and calling it a 
certain kind of transaction is as much about political recognition as it is about the items 
themselves. (In gambling for instance the winner is not obliged to compensate a loser, but 
that does not stop people from demanding that they do just that.) 3) Intangibles such as 
respect, status and/or obligation that may accrue in return for a transfer are only as concrete 
as their effects, and may be retrospectively enhanced or denuded by subsequent events, 
changing the balance of the transfers within a transaction if they are traced back to it. Starting 
at this lower, infra-conceptual level is a way to circumvent the a priori assumption within the 
term “exchange” that a return is expected, a point I elaborate on later. This is not to say that 
exchange and reciprocity are irrelevant, only that they require establishment and 
maintenance. By coupling the heuristic term “transaction” with the micro-level transfer one 
might incorporate that murkiness, and avoid employing the false clarity of prescriptive sub-
categories.  
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1) Instead of a moment of exchange, which sits somewhere in the convergence of 
perspectives that may never have actually converged (e.g. Strathern and Stewart 2000:17-18), 
let the particle of circulation be the transfer of congealed human activity from the control of 
one entity to another. Any given transaction can then accommodate multiple perspectives 
from each angle. The point of convergence at which a transfer takes place is then an arena for 
both competing valuations of the thing or service being transferred but also, and as part of 
the determination of value, the competing values of various economic philosophies and/or 
pragmatics.  
Encompassing exchanges within the scientific jargon of transfers does not place every 
kind of transfer on a single measurable scale. It is surely impossible to live without making 
categories for comparison and creating value comparisons, but the generality of the means of 
measurement are themselves highly variable and of differing degrees of abstraction within 
natural languages (Gudeman 2001:14). The term transfer is designed rather to free up 
discussion of the commensurative possibilities, constraints, and perspectives that occur 
around a transfer or grouping of transfers. The nature of the transferred item as a unit is also 
not necessary prior to the transfer, or a necessary consequence of it. Transfers are possible 
not because the things that move are immutable objects, but because the properties of things 
in the social world are given immutablity that appears objective (Verran 2001). Indeed the 
establishment, perpetuation, or erasure of the transferred object’s status as a unit may well be 
an important feature in identifying its politics and the social reality generating it (Pickles 
2013; M. Strathern 1992). The accretion of immutability through continued circulation 
provides parameters within which each party establishes their own valuations as a function of 
their separation as parties to a transaction.  
2) The mutual recognition of the coupling of transfers does not presuppose that each 
party is an autonomous agent acting in the rational pursuit of material self-interest (or any 
14 
 
other form of self-maximisation); the goal is to instead foreground the political constitution 
of distinction and mutuality through the work of delineating in each case what counts as a 
transferrable object, what are the appropriate ways that it might move, and how might that 
movement be innovated upon to the benefit of those it is being used to delineate.  
The transfer is not to be equated with disinterested giving (contra Sneath 2006, 
2012)9 except under conditions where that motivation can be clearly delineated (e.g. Davis 
1992). A given actor may choose to assess their transactions in instrumental terms, or for that 
matter through any other political philosophy. The project of understanding transactions in 
terms of transfers thereby necessitates localized ethnographic knowledge of how transactions 
are perceived. A transfer can create chains that are characterised by one party as involving 
some transfers and not others, while the other party may include and exclude completely 
different past and future transfers and partners.  
3) There are various ways in which a transfer is proscribed or limited by the nature of 
the wealth under consideration, especially in the case of permanent sources of production 
such as land, which may, for example, be allotted by a matriline, usufruct rights given, or the 
land may be leased by legal contract. In the case of valuables such as cash money or a 
harvest, which are locally unanchored and therefore have the capacity to flow out of 
immediate communities, transfers may be more often accompanied by a counter-transfer, as 
in market exchange. Some items that might conceivably be transferred but which are too 
important to do so in practice are often considered priceless or ungiftable (what Annette 
Weiner (1992) called “inalienable wealth”), negating their transfer-ability to outsiders and 
defining the boundary of insider and outsider. These heirlooms are transferred inter-
generationally, proffering continuity on the political entity asserting to have kept them.  
Side-stepping atemporal economic abstractions allows a view of historical processes 
by which valuables are recontextualised and revalued through the action of outgoing transfers 
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or equally active efforts at retentive transfers. Retention precipitates a form of valuation that 
evades enumeration and commensuration but may also be the subject of strategic action, as 
when a frequent traveller holds onto a few euros just in case. Bringing transferrable objects 
into association with inalienable wealth is another strategic action that augments their value, 
for instance a letterhead that carries a crest.  
I outline these limits because a shift in lexicon is no elixir and I am certainly no 
Pollyanna. The shadow cast by shifting focus onto transactions as composed of transfers both 
enables and necessitates switching perspectives again so as to illuminate the contours of both 
a theory and its shadow (see Jiménez and Willerslev 2007). Transfer is useful as a reflective 
prompt because it carries far less conceptual content than anthropological terms such as “gift 
exchange,” “commodity exchange,” “barter” or “hospitality,” let alone “exchange” itself. It is 
both more general, and more basic, enabling one to include a far broader array of transactions 
when filling in the content without the problem of certain forms slipping through the cracks.  
To demonstrate this potential I now discuss two transactions with distinct but 
complementary transfer dynamics: first gifting and then gambling. The coupling of the 
transfers involved in each case are politically charged in a manner that invites their 
productive juxtaposition.  
 
Pure Gifts, Maussian Gifts, Unaccompanied Transfers 
Anthropological orthodoxy distinguishes “pure gifts” from “Maussian gifts.” A pure 
gift is altruistic, an act of generosity without concern for a return, i.e. a one-way transfer. A 
Maussian gift appears the same, it too is an item conferred by a donor upon a recipient under 
the auspice that a return is voluntary. However, in a Maussian gift this auspice is deemed to 
be to various degrees delusory. Parties know that a return is obligatory and that the other 
party knows that they know that it is obligatory (Mauss 1954). Everyone participates in a 
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contrived game of free will, and early debate centred on whether self-interest was all that was 
behind it (Malinowski’s (1926:27) position) or whether generosity played an operative role 
for the individual and the interest in reciprocity came from the moral person as defined by the 
social unit (Mauss’ position [see Parry 1986:455-456]). The timing of a return upon a 
Maussian gift is potentially open-ended, but in every case there is an expectation among at 
least one party to the transaction that a return transfer will eventually take effect. This may 
end the exchange, or instigate yet other transfers in an ongoing web known as an exchange 
system. Godelier (1999:10) points out it was Mauss’ genius to reconnect the point of 
departure of original gifts to the point of arrival of their returns. I contend that this 
reconnection during analysis, and its negation (seen in the pure gift) is always essentially an 
ideological project. Lack of reciprocation is basically excluded from consideration by Mauss 
by virtue of Mauss’ interest in gifts insofar as they were precursors to contractual law, in the 
Durkheimian evolutionary tradition (Parry 1986:457).  
Pure gifts are also complicated transfers in their own ways: categorically destroying 
all feelings of obligation may be considered undesirable or even impossible (Laidlaw 2000); 
or pure gifts may have a de-purifying effect on the gift itself (Parry 1986);  or lastly because 
of the niggling faculty that humans have for conjuring immaterial counterweights (Bourdieu 
1977).  These complications are important, but all can potentially agree that a pure gift, if it 
does exist, must necessarily be a one-way transfer. 
Posing Maussian gift exchange as the structural opposite of capitalism is a straw man 
regularly unmasked in lecture theatres and seminar rooms. To achieve this unveiling, most 
oversimplify C.A. Gregory’s (1982) Gifts and Commodities to say that in gift economies (as 
opposed to capitalist economies) the important result is always and only the relationship that 
the contributions represent or bring into being, rather than the gift itself that participants 
really desire. Meanwhile in capitalist economies things characteristically take the form of 
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commodities divorced from their producers, and because that is how their subjects are 
accustomed to thinking of objects, people tend to desire the thing that is given and not the 
abstract labour relationships that created it. From that polemical starting point it is a short 
step to revealing that societies that organise their economy through delayed reciprocity 
(famous examples being the kula ring in Papua New Guinea, and potlatch in the Pacific 
Northwest) intensely desire the things themselves for themselves after all. Ipso facto one can 
then reveal that the relationship represented by a gift in a commodity economy is often in fact 
far more important than the object. It is by now well-established that the gift can be seen in 
the market transaction and object fetishism in the gift (e.g. Appadurai 1986; Carrier 1990; 
Gell 1992). The romantic association between altruistic giving and simple economies who 
practice gift exchange is then revealed as a commodity-induced projection, because the very 
possibility of separation of interest from gift is shown to be an artefact that is, if not peculiar 
to a capitalist economy, then at least correlated with it (Carrier 1990). Nowadays the current 
consensus on the importance of Maussian gifts versus pure gifts follows Parry’s common 
sense wisdom, that empirically “it is not a question of either an ideology of reciprocity or of 
its repudiation, but rather of a significant difference in the extent to which these possibilities 
are elaborated” (Parry 1986:466). 
The gift literature bedims further when one considers whether the gift itself (pure or 
Maussian) contains a spirituality that is either socially generative or polluting, and in turn 
whether that spirit emanates from the donor or some more mystical source. These occur most 
notably in debates surrounding the properties of the Maori hau or the Hindu dan/dana (e.g. 
Firth 1929; Graeber 2001; Laidlaw 2000; Levi-Strauss 1973; Parry 1986; Sahlins 1972). 
Whether or not the gift is literally or figuratively part of the person of the giver does not 
concern me here. I here bracket the “spirit of the gift” so as to draw attention to a more 
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prosaic point about how transfers become either one-way transfers known as pure gifts, or 
get coupled up to become Maussian gifts.  
In this article a Maussian gift occurs when an attempt to couple the outgoing transfer 
of economic matter to a transfer that is perceived as a return is socially recognised. A pure 
gift occurs where a return transfer is deemed unnecessary or inappropriate by all parties or by 
the presiding authority. The focus instantly shifts to the political constitution of forms of 
transaction out of their component transfers. It also immediately strikes one that, framed in 
this way, a pure gift requires a strong consensus or authority if it is to be accepted as pure and 
not Maussian. This is because any suspicion that the pure transfer might in fact be Maussian 
from either party (or any such ambiguity in the presiding authority) rather poisons the well 
for everyone. The unaccompanied transfer is always at risk because the mind works through 
connection, it therefore makes sense that unaccompanied transfers would be more common in 
authoritarian societies, where conceptual connections between transfers can be effectively 
sanctioned. 
I take a particular interest in Maussian gifts because they are conceptually more 
common than their altruistic counterparts, and because where I conduct research in Papua 
New Guinea reciprocal gifting and ceremonial exchanges are extremely conspicuous. The 
first explorers, colonial officers, missionaries and anthropologists in the Highlands of Papua 
New Guinea found some of its peoples had developed what looks like Maussian gift 
exchange into their most exulted cultural forms, a to and fro that played out over and beyond 
the lifecycle of its individual members, and involved the most valued items: usually pigs, 
shells, dog’s teeth, feathers and axes. Thousands of pigs and shells moved through vast 
networks for the bragging rights of political leaders whose fame and authority was 
manifested in large part through their transactive prowess. The colonisers fed this grand 
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competition (and ultimately undermined it) by paying those who assisted them with shells, 
steel and later money (Strathern and Stewart 2000). 
Consequently, Melanesian anthropology has its own flavour of ambivalence toward 
the Maussian gift. It is a paradigm-setting concept ever associated with Melanesia through 
Mauss’ use of Malinowski’s Trobriand material, and because Melanesia figured prominently 
as ethnographic exemplar in the anthropological discourse following from the translation of 
Mauss’ Essai sur le don into English (e.g. Foster 1995; Gregory 1982; Munn 1986; A. 
Strathern 1971; M. Strathern 1988; Thomas 1991; Weiner 1992). And yet, as James Carrier 
(1992) has argued, the gift was far less prevalent in Melanesia than it appeared, the 
commodity transaction far more common, and the ambiguities of real economic life were too 
often hidden by an essentialising character in Melanesian anthropology (see also Gell 1992). 
The application of Maussian gift-logic undoubtedly cloaks a great deal of Melanesian 
economic activity (but see Hart 1986; Healey 1990; Rappaport 1984), but negative or 
complicating argumentation such as Carrier’s is hard to rally behind, and tends to reproduce 
itself. No wonder it has become common in the exchange literature to attach the prefix “so-
called” before using the term, so “exchange societies” become “so-called exchange societies” 
(e.g. Keane 2001), and in Melanesia in particular “gift exchange” became “so-called gift 
exchange” (e.g. Feil 1988; Gregory 1980; M. Strathern 1991). Diacritics such as these are a 
good sign that the current terms are creaking under the weight of their annotations. In the 
absence of alternatives and through the canonising effect of continual diacritical exegeses, the 
Maussian gift developed into Melanesia’s dominant conceptual device. It became Melanesian 
anthropological orthodoxy to interrogate the idea that the gift, either competitive gifting or 
communistic sharing, but always binding, reciprocal and total, was at one point the 
organising principle for Melanesian sociality, and that the situation has since been muddied 
by European encroachment (Akin and Robbins 1999). In so doing, and in spite of many 
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authors’ efforts, the gift-commodity paradigm has been reinforced even while it was 
tempered. 
Anthropologists of Melanesia share with their interlocutors an overriding concern 
with setting the boundaries of transactions, implicating people in transactions with appeals to 
definitive obligations but in the knowledge that their appeals were transparently contingent 
(Pickles 2013, forthcoming). Like Melanesianists David Akin and Joel Robbins (1999), I 
found that my interlocutors “regularly work to differentiate kinds of exchanges, kinds of 
relationships, and kinds of objects” (9), and are anxious about the collapse of these 
distinctions. It therefore seemed apt to shift the lens toward the prospecting work of 
achieving the desired transactive forms (Pickles, forthcoming; cf. Munn 1986). In a context 
that foregrounds reciprocal giving as an ideal, this meant concentrating on the human work 
of connecting or disconnecting all those endless transfers.  
Furthermore, I am always affected on fieldwork by the sense of continual 
disappointment with the many failures usually involved in conscious attempts to make lasting 
connections through things. In present-day Papua New Guinea in particular, a peripheral 
nation in the grip of bad faith politicians and extractive industries and struggling with 
runaway inequalities, it is at least as important to theorise failure to successfully make 
exchanges stick as it once was to understand them working effectively. Analysing exchanges 
as transfers to be connected renders attempts to achieve a desired transaction that are 
perceived by a party to have failed on an equal analytical footing with those that succeed. 
This is probably the area in which the term transfer has the most potential. In Papua New 
Guinea at least, failure to agree on the form of a transaction and its proper deployment make 
up a very large proportion of the sum of all perspectives on transactions, and while this may 
have been exacerbated since colonial intervention, it must always have been more important 
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than it has appeared in exchange literature by default of the “exchange” unit of analysis (but 
see Munn 1986).  
While Papua New Guineans brought me to this conclusion, I am more and more 
convinced that regardless of site, reciprocal gift exchange as “observed” has always depended 
on a leap of faith on the part of the observer. Anthropologists are all too ready to follow some 
of their interlocutors’ statements, prioritising the ones that formulate “exchange” as balanced 
in a formal, abstracted sense (Bourdieu 1977: pp4-9; A. Strathern 1971:101, 104; Strathern 
and Stewart 2000:22-23). In some specific circumstances people do exchange one thing for 
an equivalent object at the same time. But delayed exchanges form the bulk of the exchange 
literature, and these depend on extrapolation from either the idea of exchange of identical 
items, or commodity exchange (but see Foster 1990). The time and space between the 
transfers in a delayed exchange invites explication, and this has fore-fronted reciprocity, 
mutuality and obligation as connecting forces. But there exists also a great deal of 
contingency, threat and existential uncertainty. Anthropologists missed a trick when we made 
a rule of assuming that gifts are usually returned, then marking out occasions when a return is 
unwelcome, rather than factoring in that they often aren’t (but see Bourdieu 1977). It is not a 
sufficient question to ask, as Godelier (1999) has asked “which principle prevails in the 
society and why?” (14, emphasis in original). The question must instead be: how a practice is 
instituted into a prevailing principle within and across social boundaries, and why? Not 
beginning from the gift concept, one is far less likely to overextend it. Beginning at a smaller 
scale with less conceptual content and building up towards transaction types might get us 
closer to people’s attempts to muddle through their economic lives. 
The argument thus far somewhat resembles Pierre Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of 
Practice (1977), within which Lévi-Strauss treatment of the Maussian gift is eviscerated. 
Lévi-Strauss is charged with objectifying reciprocity by foregrounding rules of exchange. 
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Bourdieu castigates Lévi-Strauss, claiming he effectively reified with rules a profoundly 
temporal and thus uncertain practice into a certainty, and in-so-doing overlaid upon the world 
the conditions of his own being as a socially separated, intellectually elevated rule-deriver. 
For Bourdieu the ‘full truth of the gift’ is the coexistence of two opposing truths, the 
objective model of gift-exchange as a total system, and the subjective contingency by which 
the system is experienced and reproduced. It is the temporality of gift-exchange that enables 
these two truths to coexist, and it is the responsibility of anthropology to articulate the full 
package—model, contingent experience, and temporality—as a dynamic. Where Bourdieu 
highlights temporality and its embodiment in practice as productive of social institutions, I 
use transfers to codify the multitude of available units which are the traffic of that 
temporality and the object of directed objectification by both analyst and practitioner. It is 
hoped that transfers can be used as part of anthropologists’ conceptual tool-set to make 
descriptions that stand up to Bourdieu’s high standards. The aim is to enable anthropologists 
to start whereabouts Bourdieu’s and other critiques of exchange left off, and not to simply 
repeat the critique. 
Maurer similarly argued that contemporary economic anthropology is at its best when 
it shifts “the optic from exchange to flow or circulation … [returning] the objects of exchange 
to “the space and time of their genesis” (Eiss 2002:293; Gilbert 2005; Keane 2001), revealing 
relationships missed by the reification of subjects and objects that is sometimes presumed by 
the analytical category of exchange” (2006:21; see also Munn 1986). And yet Hann 
(2006:215, 221) argues that the term transfer represents an abandonment of the broadly 
effective Maussian paradigm dominating economic anthropology, a paradigm which has done 
much to underscore obligation as the irreducible element within exchange. I am arguing 
instead that there is in fact no mutual exclusivity between transfers and the Maussian 
paradigm and will show that transfer is already an unacknowledged technique in economic 
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anthropology within and without the Maussian paradigm.  As an analytical Lego brick within 
exchanges, transfers in no sense displace existential social forces such as reciprocity or self-
maximisation, instead they aid anthropological description of their constitution. I now 
demonstrate the utility of transfers in folding one of the transactions side-lined by the 
Maussian tradition into our discourse, gambling.  
 
Gambling 
As a sub-category of transaction, gambling inevitably has fuzzy borders open to ideological 
expansion or contraction. The Oxford English Dictionary (2017) defines “gamble” as 1: 
“Play games of chance for money; bet.” And 2: “Take risky action in the hope of a desired 
result”. The definition is complicated when one considers either whether financial speculation 
has to be gambling by definitional necessity, or whether betting on games of skill or 
athleticism as opposed to chance are gambling. Still, few would go so far as to claim that 
gambling did not exist as a transactional type. For most gambling is both distinctive and 
deeply ingrained, and many assume it to be a universal feature of all societies, though in fact 
it is not (Pickles 2014a). Anglo-Saxons are among those who habitually project gambling 
onto other activities, often claiming that this or that activity is gambling if you think about it. 
Much of this has to do with popular understandings of risk, probability, and evolutionary 
theory (Reith 1999; Schüll 2012). The gambling that “lies underneath” other activities is 
therefore not prima facie explanatory, but rather an ethnographic indicator of a particular 
cosmological frame that considers gambling so relevant that it gets projected outward.  
Where gambling’s history is short, and where one cannot assume that the same 
associations with risk, probability and evolutionary theory have been instilled, then the 
contours of gambling can be quite different (Pickles 2014b). Given this diversity, I have often 
asked myself what is unique to gambling that we all seem to recognise it when we see it? 
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Where does it sit in relation to other kinds of transaction, and how variable might that 
position be? Why exactly is it close to financial speculation, and why is it far from a 
Christmas present? 
Seen from Pryor’s (1977:255) perspective gambling is a kind of one-way transfer: the 
winner is not obliged to make a return to the loser(s). From another perspective (one 
promoted by the gambling industry) a player spends money in order to gain the pleasure of 
gameplay, making for a market exchange of transfers. This perspective has been found to 
facilitate the legitimization of gambling as one among many entertainment products. The 
larger game surrounds sometimes lend themselves to still another perspective, one in which 
losers are indirectly compensated by winners with peripheral items or chances to play again, 
resulting in an imbalanced exchange of transfers. It is immediately obvious that the link 
between transfers surrounding gambling (or lack thereof) are an arena for politics that has 
considerable effect upon not only the moral status of the activity but also the value created, 
exchanged or destroyed by it. 
From the perspective of most players there is no doubt that during play the defining 
mechanic is betting, which translates as the opportunity for players to elicit a one-way 
transfer towards themselves. By staking money (i.e. by committing it to being part of a 
consolidated transfer) gamblers attempt to gain valuables that have been divorced from 
reciprocal obligation, and so cause a one-way transfer in their own direction. (A winner 
regains his stake, and therefore can be said not to have made an outgoing transfer.) Leaving 
aside the “gambling as exchange” perspective so beloved by industry and some 
anthropologists, and concentrating on most players’ perspective of gambling as one-way 
transfer, brings to light some interesting effects that gambling has on the value of stakes. In 
betting, the value of the stakes are compared as they are consolidated, as opposed to what 
happens in a contemporaneous exchange of transfers, when the value of the wealth is 
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compared as the things are exchanged. It is valuation by association rather than valuation by 
friction. Valuation is underdetermined compared to an exchange of transfers because winning 
allows the victor to take home both the value of their stake as well as some (or all) of the 
other valuables staked by others. Gambling therefore privileges subjective assessments of the 
value of one’s stake as opposed to the market value of that stake. Subjective valuation is 
heightened by the repeated rounds of play, in which participants may choose to anchor their 
success against highpoints, lowpoints, or the starting point of their bank.  
In staking their subjective assessments of value gamblers explore and potentially 
master the flow of transfers that are the building blocks of economic life in what equates to a 
“tournament of value” (Appadurai 1986). The manipulation of value is most apparent in 
gambling partly because the transactions that occur are not straightforwardly economic. 
Under normal exchange conditions the economic value of items is made evident when the 
transfers are exchanged, but in gambling the items are transferred from one person to another 
without referent to anything outside of the pot. Money is moved without it being made to 
correspond to another object or service. Gambling shares this property with other one-way 
forms of transfer (grants, charity, household pooling, and theft) and, to a lesser extent, to acts 
of delayed reciprocity.  
By contrast to Maussian gifting, gambling enforces certain rules that purport to make 
it stand out from everyday rounds of give and take as a one-sided transaction rather than a 
gift bound up with obligations of return. In gambling the stake is tied to the unforeseeable 
result of an event that, when resolved, strictly determines an outcome. Gambling therefore 
has among its defining characteristics the negation of a mutual assumption among players 
that one should be obliged to reciprocate the flow of valuables that occurs during the course 
of a game. If one was obliged to give a loser an amount equivalent to what one won, this 
would not be gambling. Compensation must be voluntary. Gambling must therefore be seen 
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as a one-way transfer. If reciprocity is felt necessary, it usually comes in the form of a free 
game, a token return, or the axiom that a winner must keep playing until a loser gives up. 
Gambling is in this respect a vehicle for increasing not just your wealth but also choice about 
whether to donate and who to donate to, as well as propagating a preponderance of one-way 
transfers. It is only by reifying the excitement of play (which must be done at a remove from 
play itself) that it can appear on another level as an exchange of transfers (excitement for 
money), but to generate the excitement itself it must be experienced as a one-way transfer. 
Part of that excitement is often generated by repeat play, when the one-way transfers are 
themselves linked together in a run that is the subject of both lay and expert reflection. Here 
statistics and speculation alike ponder the connection of paradigmatically unconnected 
transactions. 
As such gambling can be seen as a schema of transaction in which the carrot of a one-
way transfer induces transfers to be consolidated and then redistributed. The impetus for the 
trustworthiness of the one-way transfer is mandated by an event or set of events that are 
perceived to occur beyond the capacity for any one stakeholder to determine with certainty. 
Gambling is a particularly underdetermined one-way transfer, offering the potential for 
exploration of both possibility and an interrogation of the valuables that are transferred. 
Apparently divorced from obligation, the participants are free to make their own plays and 
initiate their own flows of reciprocity with their winnings and losses. It therefore sits at the 
nexus of transactional possibilities, modelling an initiatory gift, the play of reciprocity over 
time, and the exchange of wealth for entertainment.  
The language of transfers opens up the conceptual possibilities of gambling, revealing 
a broader exploration of the potential for generally accepted stores of value to respond to 
individual efforts to make those valuables work for them, with distinct effects under different 
conceptual conditions, but always with the potential to make more of people’s transactions 
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into one-way transfers and to expand the domain of ‘one-way transfers’ as an explanatory 
idiom. By reifying the enjoyment of play and/or heightening distribution choices, it may also 
highlight the contingency involved in connecting up transfers. One can likewise easily 
compare the transfer dynamics of Maussian gifts and gambling. Where Maussian gifts 
involve transfers that are spread over time so that they risk becoming one-way transfers and 
are ultimately satisfying when resolved, gambling intensifies transfers over a short time 
while playing up their one-way status and generating the expectation that the next win is just 
around the corner and causing speculation upon the nature of links between discrete 
transactions. Gambling and Maussian gifting are therefore a kind of transfer chiasmatic 
image of each other.  
If the potential utility of using transfers analytically consists of stripping back any 
transaction’s politics in order to describe that politics as process, it will bolster my argument 
if I can demonstrate that, in fact, anthropologists have been using the English vernacular 
word ‘transfer’ to do just the same thing for quite some time, although without 
acknowledging as much and therefore underutilising that potential. 
 
 
Existing “transfer” work in Anthropology 
In an effort to clarify their politics, anthropologists often strip transactions back to an 
untheorized, vernacular usage of the word ‘transfer’ – noun: “1. An act of moving something 
or someone to another place, organization, team, etc.” (OED 2018). A transfer stratagem 
therefore exists nascently in a good deal of the anthropological literature, establishing 
precedents to the current argument and more importantly demonstrating transfer’s utility. In 
economic anthropology the vernacular language of transfer is consistently used to describe 
the moment of movement in a transaction under conditions where the nature of the 
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transaction described is yet to be established by argument. For instance, in Towards an 
Anthropological Theory of Value David Graeber (2001) uses “transfer” or “transferring” 
when he wishes to highlight the ambiguity of either the motivation behind the movement of a 
valuable or its economic status, hence: “a potlatch turned on a contrast between two sorts of 
transfer: the host received a unique title … at the same time defining the guests as faceless 
and generic in comparison,” “we have encountered extremely complicated systems of transfer 
in which the exact dimensions of “groups” are rarely entirely clear,” “the subsequent transfer 
of names occurs not only within one’s own moiety but within one’s matriclan” (210, 226, 
143). Graeber even adopts a definition of gifts that hinges on the emptiness of the term 
transfer: “To give a gift is to transfer something without any immediate return, or guarantee 
that there will ever be one.” (Graeber 2001:225, citing Godbout and Caillé 1998). Gregory 
and Parry both use transfer in much the same way, as does Yan.13  
Carrier (1990) characterises Mauss as claiming that a gift acquires meaning insofar as 
it is “the transfer of something identified with the giver” (24). This becomes increasingly 
problematic under capitalism, Carrier shows, because people rarely make what they give or 
acquire it through gifting, and that therefore the gift becomes a special kind of transaction. In 
other words, in the construction “the transfer of something identified with the giver” the word 
“transfer” does the work of opening us to the possibility that there might be other kinds of 
transaction that would still result in the same transfer of that thing to that other person. Some 
ambiguity is welcomed in, and this is a most useful property of the emptiness of the 
vernacular word transfer, which implies movement without intimating cause or consequence, 
a word that can cover everything from iron-on pictures for clothing, changing form of 
transportation on the same ticket, all the way to professional sportspeople switching 
employers. 
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All this is perhaps unsurprising, because in describing the charge ascribed to 
movements of wealth one often needs recourse to a term that does not already imply such 
charge, and transfer fits the bill well. By contrast, Laidlaw’s (2000) discussion of alms for 
Shvetambar Jain renouncers as among the closest real world parallel to “pure gifts” contains 
no such reference to transfers, perhaps because the argument is that pure gifts create no 
friends and therefore no space for such ambiguities. 
It is precisely the politics of ambiguity that Marilyn Strathern (2012) depicts at play in 
the donation of human bodily material and its use for scientific or medicinal purposes in the 
UK. Given the sheer technical specialism required to appropriately remove, artificially 
sustain, implant or otherwise utilize each kind of bodily material, the term transfer seems 
uniquely appropriate to the subject matter, and it is certainly not a coincidence that “organ 
transfer” is a technical term. More than this, Strathern argues that the absence of a system of 
monetary purchase to grease the wheels of bodily material transfers heightens the ambiguity 
surrounding them, thereby heightening the sense in which these movements are best seen as 
“transfers.” “It is as though a shadowy contract had been created by the transfer, maintained 
as a debt the one owes or has discharged to the other” (Strathern 2012:401). Tensions are 
high because in most of the cases Strathern describes the donor of bodily material is dying or 
has died just minutes ago. The material is anthropologically fertile because it is an 
ethnographic situation so riddled with ambiguity and yet so suffused with high feeling that 
any use of a term which is not devoid of conceptual content could not manage to describe it. 
This time it is the ambiguity of the term “transfer” in “organ transfer” used throughout the 
text that enables the conflicts to coexist.  
Nancy Munn’s (1986) work on value and exchange on Gawa within the Kula Ring 
also uses transfers in the same untheorized but content-stripping way that Graeber, Strathern, 
Gregory, Parry and Yan do. In Munn’s terms human action consists of attempts to control 
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intersubjective space-time, extending it out with your Maussian gifts to your partners and 
allies, such that the waves created by your actions are reified into fame. Fame is the endpoint 
rather than exchange for the sake of exchange. The means for achieving this goal is to engage 
creatively with extant types of exchange, rather than simply replicating exchange forms. The 
result is a transformation of intersubjective space-time. Graeber conjectures that the reason 
Munn’s theory has been little taken up is that it seems to evade any solid transactional form 
such that we might say that such-and-such amount of value has been invested in such-and-
such object (Graeber 2001:45-46). It is perhaps the best example of theorising economy 
through terms that are themselves processual, which it does by developing a language of its 
own before turning to ethnographic description. I would hope that developing a usable 
language that can deal with inconsistent transactional forms could facilitate more of this kind 
of ethnography. 
Among these anthropologists ‘transfer’ is used just as it is in the English vernacular, 
to imply movement in possession without assuming the nature of the connection. It would be 
likewise informative to look at other languages’ ‘transfer’ equivalents and to problematize the 
conceptual biases of using the English language, even at this level of abstraction. I 
nevertheless think that, given that we must at least begin with our common language, the 
transfer is an advantageous one to begin with for the purposes of explicating ethnographic 
ideas, practices, and pragmatics of transaction. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Linking transactions in terms of transfers rather than at the level of types of exchange sets 
gambling and other neglected transactional forms as equals among transactions. It also 
provides a process-oriented concept that enables description, a unit that can be put to work to 
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describe the traffic of temporality. I have argued that really any coherent analytical method 
that shifts our attention away from a market vs gift exchange, economist vs anthropologist set 
of dichotomies is a potentially valuable resource. Especially so given the persistent feeling 
that contemporary anthropologists who highlight reciprocity are merely arguing against 
economists who are in fact long dead while current economists simply ignore, or never hear 
the critique. I have no desire to rehearse anthropology’s exchange-centric denouncement of 
homo-economicus again. Economics and anthropology apparently once had a productive 
relationship, but it was considered long gone as early as 1962 (Burling 1962; see also Hart 
1986). The problem of marrying economic and anthropological perspectives on economy was 
put succinctly by Stephen Gudeman (2001:81), who proposed that anthropologists and 
economists are caught in a dialectic; both offering clearly distinct but equally essentialist 
views, anthropologists overemphasise reciprocity, relationality and altruism, economists do 
the same for atomism, markets and egoism (but see Schokkaert 2006). As Davis notes, 
charity and altruism are as awkward to market economists as theft and barter are to 
“reciprocalist economists” (read anthropologists) (Davis 1992:24). Their contrast is a product 
of the dyadic, totalising tendencies of the disciplines, which we would do well to circumvent, 
and it so happens I think transfers fits the bill.   
We have been critiquing economists for their emphasis on markets, but many moved 
on long ago to an interest in transfers, and it is time anthropologists gave their own 
theoretical clarity to the concept. Economic analysis is in the business of testing the 
connections between transfers in a causal manner. What anthropology can bring to the 
economic analysis of transfers is a micro-analysis of the politics involved in correlating 
transfers, both on the ground and in a publicly engaged discipline. What economics brings is 
hard data on whether and in what ways the economic matter moved by transfers has 
empirical effects on later transfers whether or not they are conceptually connected by those 
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involved. Anthropology is then able to offer analyses that account both for the micro-politics 
of transfer connection, but also the blind-spots, the cognitive dissonance, and the uncanny 
connections that are there but go unseen.  
I have attempted to hold my gaze firmly on the transfers themselves and compare 
them before characterising the nature of the obligations or desires generating them. This is 
not to throw out or ignore the politics that lead to alienation in the production and sale of 
commodities any more than it is to forget that reciprocity is an ever present possibility that 
can take communistic as well as competitive forms. These are as important points as they 
have ever been. The aim of my argument, however, is to get away from the idea of 
transactions as the locus of vague conceptual unity, with its birds-eye view, contractual, 
agreement bias, and move towards a language in which things as conceptually challenging as 
gambling and bride wealth payments can be schematised without contradiction using the 
scale of movement which unites them. To do so is to introduce a degree of diversity and 
contingency that both confounds a separation of us as market transactors and they as gifters 
and makes the transactive possibilities simultaneously familiar and relatable. I placed 
gambling and Maussian gifting alongside each other, but we could in fact go much further 
and broader in our comparisons while retaining a processual, temporal descriptive frame. 
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5 Davis (1992:29) for example makes a partial repertoire of British exchanges, listing 42 possible kinds of 
exchange. The jargon situation has not improved since then (Hann 2006). 
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7 The component should be locally defined. E.g. if, when contributing to a mortuary payment, a portion of 
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8 The value of the valuable involved in a one-way transfer can of course still be compared to other valuables in 
the abstract. 
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